

27 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: SR/DOB Ops  
FROM : SR/DOB ABCOB Project Case Officer  
SUBJECT : Apparent Security Breach

1. On 17, 18, and 19 April 1953, [ ] attended the annual Congress of the American Latvian Association (ALA) in Grand Rapids, Michigan. In addition to procuring sufficient information for PRQ Part I on several prospective spotters, [ ] was also instructed to mingle among the attending delegates for the purpose of keeping the case officer informed of current thinking, planning, and activities of the Latvian emigres.

2. In the course of carrying out his assignment, [ ] was approached by an acquaintance who inquired whether [ ] had, who resides in Washington, had met a man by the name of Linde, who has recently moved there. Since [ ]'s reply indicated that he knew no such person, he was advised by this acquaintance that it would be wise to meet Linde because the latter is getting to be very influential, as he is working for CIA, has an annual salary of \$7,000 and will no doubt emerge as a leading Latvian personality. According to this same acquaintance, Linde had originally been offered the sum of \$5,000 per annum, but (according to Linde's statements) he had held out until CIA agreed to pay him \$7,000 a year.

3. [ ] subsequently had some numerous other acquaintances and friends who told him that Linde is employed by CIA. In addition, remarks were also made that Linde does some translations and that prior to his employment with CIA he had been so thoroughly investigated that his entire home town had been deluged by "secret personnel", who were engaged in checking him. This "secret personnel" was alleged to have had people surveille Linde, check on everyone who knew him, and investigate everything very thoroughly.

4. The impression that [ ] carried away from this Congress was that the fact that Linde is working for CIA at the aforementioned salary is an "open secret" within the Latvian emigres.

5. Upon receipt of this information on 25 April, the undersigned immediately informed Chief, SR/DOB, verbally. The Chief, SR/DOB suggested the following action:

- a. That the undersigned submit a detailed report of this security breach.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)  
(2)(A) Privacy ☐  
(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒  
(2)(C) Foreign Relations ☐

**SECRET**  
Security Information

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by the Central Intelligence Agency  
Date: 2005

b. That Linde be subjected to a Polygraph interrogation.

6. In a discussion with Chief, DOB Training Section, it was agreed that suggestions made by Chief, SR/DOB would be honored, with the exception that prior to the Polygraph interrogation, Linde would be interrogated by ☐ and the undersigned. Subject interrogation may provide an admission from Linde which would preclude the Polygraph test.

7. This report is forwarded for your approval and comments.

SR/DOB/MPH:cm

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee  
1 - Chief, SR/DOB  
✓2 - Originator  
1 - Chrono